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CONTENTS
• Unlike previous steps in West European integration, the Treaty of Maastricht contains
hardly any of the liberal elements which had so far kept the centralizing and bureaucratic
features of the EC in check. The treaty embodies a vision of a uniform EC, to be modelled
along the lines of an interventionist nation state.
• Maastricht is the culmination of an integration strategy which was designed for a small
number of West European countries. At least since the fall of the Berlin wall, this inward-
looking approach has been wrong for Western Europe. With respect to a European integra-
tion that goes beyond the Western half of the continent, Maastricht leads into a dead end.
• The interventionist provisions of Maastricht, the harmonisation approach to the completion
of the single market and the general strengthening of the common redistributive policies are
barriers to an enlargement of the EC. This runs directly counter to the overriding task of
European policy for the coming years: the re-integration of the European post-communist
countries into the European mainstream.
• The attempt to pursue the two separate goals of economic integration and political unifica-
tion within a single and uniform institution, the EC, is at the root of the major problems of
European integration. The frequent blurring of economics and politics makes for bad econo-
mics and bad politics at the same time: It strengthens the EC's bias towards interventionist
and politicized solutions to economic problems. It also impairs a close and effective political
cooperation between the core countries of the EC because other members are obliged to
participate even if they are merely interested in a common market.
• To reconcile the parallel processes of economic widening and political deepening, European
integration needs to be re-defined along classical liberal lines. Ideally , Europe should intro-
duce a clear separation between politics and economics so that political goals such as an
ever-closer Franco-German cooperation or the prevention of Serbian-style aggressions
could be pursued effectively in a suitable political club, whereas economic integration could
progress in a broader economic club.
• If the EC is to become deeper and wider without burdening itself with an ever-greater
potential for internal conflicts, it will have to concentrate its common activities on fewer
and more essential tasks. It will have to put less emphasis on harmonisation and economic
interventionism, scale down its harmful and divisive redistributive activities and weaken
the link between economic integration and political cooperation.
• In the Treaty of Maastricht, the subsidiarity principle is formulated in such general terms as
to be almost useless. The principle needs to be clarified along liberal lines. To serve as an
effective safeguard against excessive centralisation, it should then be elevated to a consti-
tutional level so that it takes precedence over all existing and future Community legislation.
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Ever since the fall of the Imperium Romanum, separate centres of
power and diverse modes of organising human interaction have
flourished and competed in the geographic and ethnic diversity of
Western and Central Europe [Jones, 1981], ultimately giving rise to a
Western civilisation based on a relatively deep respect for in-
dividual rights. Unlike some short-lived empires forged by force, the
postwar attempt to create a supranational Western Europe by inter-
national contracts has not yet lost momentum. Thirty-five years after
the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community, the
governments of the twelve present member states stipulated further
ambitious goals in the Treaty of Maastricht. If fully realised,
Maastricht could invest the European Community with the major classi-
cal attributes of statehood and relegate the nation states to mere
regions of a larger federal unit. At the same time, the rank of
would-be members seems to be swelling by the month. Yet, this essay
argues that a Maastricht-style European Union can hardly serve as a
feasible institutional arrangement for the present twelve members of
the EC. It is clearly unsuitable for a future commonwealth of some
three dozen highly diverse countries. Maastricht substantially
complicates the major task which the EC has to face in the coming
years: the re-integration of Central and Eastern Europe's emerging
market economies into the European mainstream.
In order to discuss the future of the European Community, I first
list some driving forces of regional economic integration and present
a stylised history of the EC. Thereafter, I deal with the external
challenges for the EC and the EC's first inward-looking response,
i.e. the Treaty of Maastricht. I conclude with some thoughts on how
the EC could overcome the conflict between widening and deepening by
thoroughly redefining European integration along classical liberal
lines.
Slightly revised version of a lecture given at the General Meeting of
the Mont Pelerin Society in Vancouver, August 30 to September 4,
1992.II. Driving Forces of Regional Economic Integration
On the most general level, regional economic integration in Western
Europe continues to be driven by two major, albeit rather different,
forces:
(1) Decreasing costs of transporting goods, supplying services,
transmitting information, relocating production sites, switching
high-skill jobs and moving capital across national frontiers
have been undermining the petty regulations of small nation
states. The power to impose capital controls, collect an in-
flation tax and temporarily boost employment by surprise in-
flation has also been impaired. Unwilling to simply liberalise
their markets, governments are tempted to preserve their regu-
latory power by enlarging the geographic area to which regu-
lations are applied, substituting harmonised supranational
regulations for the previous national ones and abandoning
national currencies in favour of a common monopoly money. As
national redistributive policies are threatened by an increased
mobility of capital and high-earning professionals, i.e. of tax
bases [Wildasin, 1990], a common redistributive and social
policy has an obvious political appeal.
(2) Liberal-minded governments have been trying to redress the
skewed internal balance between protectionist lobbies and
supporters of openness by a reciprocal liberalisation with close
neighbours which confers noticeable benefits on an easily
identifiable group of exporters. By making an international
commitment to openness, governments may also be tying their
hands and curtail the scope for protectionist negative-sum
games.
These two driving forces correspond to two fundamentally different
integration concepts for the EEC. Following Fritz Baade [1957, p. 4],
the concepts can be labelled "liberal" and "authoritarian". The
liberal position holds that economic integration should be nothing
other than the removal of impediments to voluntary and hence mutuallybeneficial transactions between individuals who happen to live on
different sides of a border. The liberalisation of markets need not
and should not go along with a harmonisation of national laws and
regulations, a fusion of bureaucracies and the creation of inter-
ventionist supranational institutions. Economic integration in the
liberal sense reduces the role of the state and promotes the inter-
national competition of diverse institutional arrangements. The
opposite holds for the authoritarian position. This position is based
on the premise that international competition would produce desirable
results only if it were not "distorted" by differences between the
countries in the legal, institutional and social framework (in modern
terminology: "playing fields" need to be "level"). Barriers to trade
should only be lifted if the citizens are subjugated to harmonised
policies at the same time. Hence, the integration effort ought to be
limited to those states ready to cede sufficient sovereignty to
supranational bodies. As a harmonisation of policies, for instance of
social policies, impairs the competitiveness of firms in previously
less-regulated (or less effectively regulated) countries, economic
integration ought to be complemented by a compensatory re-distri-
bution of income from richer to poorer members.
III. A Stylised History of the Community
From the very beginning of the postwar period, European economic
integration has been intermingled with politics. The origin of the
Community can be traced back to a remarkable turnaround in French
foreign policy after the three Western occupation zones in Germany
had become a new state, West Germany, in late 1949. Realising that
the previous policy of keeping Western Germany fragmented and at bay
had become infeasible, leading French politicians sought to co-opt
West Germany as a junior partner into a close Franco-German alliance,
binding the countries together by common institutions. The Common
Market for Coal and Steel (ECSC) in Western Europe, which France
proposed in early 1950 and which was established by France together
with West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries in 1952, embodiedthis approach. Britain decided to abstain because of its opposition
to the supranational features of the ECSC [Haas, 1958].
When the more ambitious plans to create a European defence community
and a European political community consisting of the six ECSC members
were rejected by the French Assemblee Nationale in August 1954,
prominent supporters of European political unification changed tack.
They opted for an indirect approach which shaped the pattern of West
European integration until the end of the 1980s: A common market was
to become the nucleus of political integration [Kiisters, 1982]. In
1958, the six ECSC members formed the EEC (and the Atomic Community
Euratom) . At the insistence of de Gaulle, the EEC rejected the
British proposal for a broader West European free trade area.
Due to the emphasis put on common institutions, advocates of the
authoritarian integration approach found natural allies in those
federalists who favoured the establishing of a common market as a
necessary detour on the way to an eventual political unification of
west-central Europe. As economic decision making was seen as a trial
run for uniform politics, the authoritarian approach often prevailed
in the evolution of the EEC, the most notorious example being, of
course, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Fortunately, the CAP did not set the norm for all EEC activities,
which usually combined liberal and authoritarian features. Intern-
ally, the customs union was completed by mid-1968, i.e. even 18
months ahead of schedule. Externally, the EEC did not turn into an
outright fortress. Instead, apprehensions on the part of the U.S. and
other outsiders about a detrimental diversion of trade gave a major
impetus to multilateral trade negotiations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Unlike the GATT rounds of the
1950s, the Dillon Round (1961-62), and especially the Kennedy Round
(1964-67), resulted in substantial tariff cuts for most industrial
goods in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Yet, throughout its history,
the EC has pioneered ways to evade the liberalising impact of the
GATT agreements, be it by erecting non-tariff barriers to trade, bygranting subsidies or, most recently, by resorting to contingent
protection, such as anti-dumping procedures. '
As a reaction to the EEC, Britain, three countries with close
economic ties to Britain (Denmark, Norway and Portugal) and three
countries committed to political neutrality and thus unwilling to
join the Community (Switzerland, Austria and Sweden) formed the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) for non-agricultural products
in May 1960. Yet, liberalisation among the EFTA countries, which were
mostly small and located at opposite fringes of Western Europe, was
no alternative to trade with the EEC. In the 1960s, the position of
EFTA producers on the EEC market deteriorated dramatically. For
instance, the ratio of West Germany's imports from EFTA countries to
its imports from the EEC declined from 66 percent in 1960 to a mere
28 percent in 1972 [Schmieding, 1988, p. 26]. Under the impact of a
substantial distortion of trade flows, Britain, Denmark, Portugal and
Norway repeatedly applied to join the EC during the 1960s. In 1973,
they were finally admitted to the club, although in the end Norway's
voters rejected the terms in a referendum. At the same time, the EC
concluded free trade agreements for manufactures with the remaining
EFTA countries. Note that Iceland, Finland and Liechtenstein
eventually became EFTA members.
Having not been a member of the EEC when the Common Agricultural
Policy was designed, Britain with its relatively small, efficient and
open farming sector was forced to accept the established facts before
it could join the club, although the trade-off between the CAP'S
supposed benefits to farmers and bureaucrats and the costs to
consumers and taxpayers was extremely negative for Britain. One
decade later, Margaret Thatcher merely secured a financial rebate.
Apart from the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1978/79 and the enlargements of the EC on its southern rim (which
1) For a critical appraisal of the EC anti-dumping policy, see
Messerlin [1989].became effective for Greece in 1981 and for Spain and Portugal in
1986), little happened in European economic integration between the
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. In the mid-1980s, at a time when Western
Europe was recovering from the second oil shock and from the mis-
guided attempt to combat the consequences of this change in relative
prices by practising demand management, the dormant process of
European integration was reinvigorated by the programme to complete
the EC single market by the end of 1992. The legal basis was the
Single European Act of 1986 which curtailed the right of member
states to block EC activities by a national veto. Once again,
economic integration was interpreted as a way to foster ever-closer
political cooperation. Once again, the EC approach entailed both
liberal and authoritarian aspects, namely a genuine opening of
hitherto sheltered national markets within the EC and an adjustment
of national regulatory systems after the abolition of internal fron-
tiers . Road transport and financial services have been among the
major sectors in which the pursuit of Project 1992 has indeed
resulted in substantial liberalisation. Furthermore, the remaining
restrictions on the free flow of capital within the EC have been
removed (with exceptions for Greece and Portugal until 1995).
Yet, despite the rhetoric as regards the mutual recognition of
national practices, the construction of the Internal Market 1992 has
proceeded to a large extent via the harmonisation of national laws
and regulations. Mutual recognition would have allowed members to
maintain their diversity. Norms, regulations, tax systems and public
services in the various countries would have been put to the test of
the market; the search for welfare-enhancing institutional inno-
vations would not have been restrained. Harmonisation by decree has
restricted consumers' and producers' choices and may possibly have
been misused as a protectionist tool.
By mid-1989, the economic and institutional deepening of the EC was
still on its pre-planned track. Project 1992 was making progress,
talks on an eventual monetary union had been initiated and the small
group of mostly Mediterranean applicants (or would-be applicants) for
membership could easily be held at arm's length. Suddenly, thepeaceful revolution which swept east-central Europe in 1989 and
shattered the Soviet Union in late 1991 changed the political face of
Europe. With the end of the clear-cut confrontation between East and
West, one of the major factors which had promoted political co-
operation across the Atlantic and within Western Europe - and which
had limited the scope for independent foreign policies - ceased to
exist. Germany was reunited, the repercussions of EC policy on its
neighbours became more obvious, and the queue of would-be members was
lengthened by the neutral EFTA countries, for whom the concept of
neutrality had largely lost its meaning, and by the newly liberated
countries of the East, who could finally express their desire to
rejoin the European mainstream. Now that the cold-war straitjacket
has been removed for good, the EC will have to cope with new external
challenges.
IV. New External Challenges
1. The Demise of the Present EFTA
What is wrong with the EC, one may ask, with so many governments
wanting their countries to join the club? The EC has become Europe's
pole of attraction not because it is such a good club but because it
is so large and important. Take the example of the present EFTA
members. Being small and geographically dispersed on the fringes of
the EC, these countries are in a peculiar position with respect to
international competition for mobile resources. Up to a point, their
attractiveness as a site for producing tradeable goods and services
depends less on their own policies than on the conditions of access
to their major market, the EC. Because of the stunning redirection of
trade flows which the formation of the EEC brought about between the
late 1950s and the early 1970s, the EFTA members have taken a keen
interest in the EC's Project 1992. Initially, almost all of them
would have preferred to partake in the EC internal market without
joining the Community. The model for such an arrangement would have
been the 1972 agreements on free trade in manufactures between the
EFTA countries and the EC.10
In 1991, the EC and the EFTA countries indeed negotiated a treaty on
a European Economic Area (EEA), which basically extended the single
market to the EFTA. Under the terms of the agreement, the EFTA
countries are to adopt the relevant parts of the EC's "aquis commu-
nautaire". Apart from token consultations, they have not been given a
say in the future evolution of the common regulations. If the single
market had been built largely on the liberal principle of a mutual
recognition of national practices, this second-class treatment of
EFTA might not have made much of a difference. However, because of
the EC's harmonisation approach, the EEA option has lost its initial
appeal. Most EFTA countries now want to join the EC as soon as
possible so that they can at least marginally influence the future
evolution of the extensive body of regulations which they will have
to accept anyhow. Furthermore, the EC has exacted a substantial
contribution to its costly redistributive policies from the EFTA
countries. If the EFTA members have to pay anyway, they might as well
join the EC and participate in the decisions on how the money is
used.
The EC's harmonisation approach has thus helped to trigger what the
EC had wanted to avoid. No longer inhibited by considerations about
political neutrality in a bipolar world and no longer harbouring
illusions about a Nordic socialism, almost all EFTA countries are
queueing up to enter the EC.
2. The Case of the Emerging Market Economies '
Besides wanting to access the EC market, major segments of the new
ruling elites in the emerging market economies (EMEs) perceive
East-West integration as an important means of stabilising their
nascent institutions, of forestalling a slide into economic inter-
ventionism and political authoritarianism (the "Latin American
2) The arguments made in the following paragraphs are developed
in more detail in Schmieding [1991, 1992].11
spectre") and of partly filling the power vacuum left behind by the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
The institutional void which characterises the first phase of the
transformation process in post-communist Europe presents a grave
hazard and a splendid opportunity at the same time. The hazard is
obvious: the length and depth of the transformation crisis will
depend on the rapid emergence and the stability of new and market-
conformable institutions. Opportunities for the emerging market
economies are enticing: as the old system had shaped almost every
aspect of the body politic and the body economic, its collapse has
created a unique opportunity to dispose of inherited slack and adopt
coherent first-best solutions.
The organisation of the old elite, the communist party, is so dis-
credited, at least in the westernmost EMEs, as to wield little
political influence. New distributional coalitions need time to
organise themselves. And indeed, Poland, for instance, jumped into a
market economy in 1990 with its doors open so wide for imports that
it could have served as a model for the world. And Czechoslovakia was
not far behind in 1991. However, as special interest groups usually
catch up over time, protectionist pressures will grow stronger,
jeopardising the more or less liberal regime which was introduced in
the early phase of the transformation process. Poland's substantial
tariff increases in 1991 underscored this hazard. Ideally, a proper
Western European club would offer the newly liberated countries
an unimpeded flow of goods and services, capital and skills, and
ideas and technology between Eastern and Western Europe, based
on the principle of mutual recognition of national practices,
a source of external discipline which might turn the liberal-
isation progress in the EMEs into a lasting achievement.
Ideally, an appropriately reformed EC would have immediately supplied
such an opportunity for a credible precommitment to liberal
principles: offering immediate membership - or at least the firm12
promise of accession in a few years - and subjecting the EMEs to a
tight standstill on external protection, to an enhanced EC code
against internal subsidies and to the jurisdiction of the EC Court of
Justice in commercial matters. "Returning to Europe" has enjoyed
considerable popularity in Central and Eastern Europe. ' The argument
"sorry, we cannot grant protection or further subsidies because
otherwise we would not get into the EC" would probably be the best
armour against protectionist demands that liberal politicians in the
EMEs could hope for.
So much for the ideal situation - I now turn to reality. The EC has
indeed reacted to the demise of political and economic totalitarian-
ism in Central and Eastern Europe by offering somewhat enhanced
market access. On 16 December 1991, the Community signed association
agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia which may also
serve as models for negotiations with other EMEs, for instance
Slovenia and the Baltic countries. The trade provisions of the three
association agreements came into force at the beginning of March
1992.
The general provisions of the agreement with Poland, which are
similar to those in agreements with Hungary and the CSFR, are quite
remarkable, at least as compared with the association agreements
which the EC has concluded with other countries in the past. The EC
will immediately eliminate many import quotas and many customs duties
and abolish most other tariffs in a stepwise fashion after one or
four years. For so-called sensitive products, the EC will grant
duty-free tariff quotas which will be widened until the duties are
3) On popular attitudes in the EMEs towards the EC and other
Western institutions, see Commission of the EC [1992]. In the
coming years, rising nationalistic sentiment may spur on a
temporary anti-EC (and anti-German) backlash in those EMEs where
the economic crisis continues. The backlash is likely to be only
temporary, though, as the fears on which it may be based
("selling out to foreigners" and "allowing expelled Germans to
return") will turn out to be unfounded and will subside.Bibiiofhek
des Instituts fur Welfwirtschaft
13
phased out after five years at the latest. The EC has also agreed to
abolish its tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports of Polish
textiles and clothing products within six years and for coal and
4) steel within five years.
 ;
Unfortunately, the liberalisation remains incomplete in three major
respects. First, agriculture and fisheries are largely exempted (Art.
18-23) although Poland has a considerable export potential in
agricultural produce. Second, the EC is entitled to apply its anti-
dumping policy to Polish imports (Art. 29 and 33). Anti-dumping
provisions have become one of the EC's most powerful protectionist
tools. Third, a variety of safeguard clauses against an unwarranted
increase in imports has enabled the EC (or Poland) to "adopt the
appropriate measures" (Art. 33,3,b). In other words: imports may be
restricted if they threaten to do what international trade is
supposed to do, namely to induce a noticeable welfare-enhancing
(re-)specialisation in production according to comparative ad-
vantages . '
With regard to binding Poland's external economic policy vis-a-vis
the EC, the agreement contains some recommendable features. It
includes a general standstill clause for customs duties, quantitative
restrictions and equivalent barriers to mutual trade in non-agri-
cultural products (Art. 25, 1-3). After a transition period of three
years, Poland will subject itself to the - admittedly rather lax -
standards which govern public subsidies to the EC's own backward
regions. However, safeguard clauses and exemptions from both the
standstill and the anti-subsidies code offer Poland's emerging
lobbies considerable scope to clamour for some sort of special
treatment which would not violate the agreement. The reference to a
4) For a more detailed assessment, see Langhammer [1992] and
Schmieding [1992].
5) Hindley [1992] has emphasised the vast scope which the association
agreements leave for contingent protection.14
possible EC accession remains vague. The agreement does not serve to
stabilise Poland's new and relatively liberal economic regime.
All in all, the agreement is only an unsatisfactory first step. The
EC had originally hoped that the EMEs would gratefully accept as-
sociation as a viable alternative to EC membership for the time
being. Unsurprisingly, the agreements have not served this purpose.
The westernmost EMEs are still pressing for early accession to the
club. As in the case of the EFTA countries, what the EC has been
ready to offer its neighbours has not been enough.
V. The EC's First Response: The Treaty of Maastricht
1. The Road to Maastricht
(West) Germany's immediate response to the revolution of 1989 was
quite remarkable.In the late 1980s, Germany and Europe had been
divided for as long as most Germans could remember, the different
parts belonging to antagonistic military alliances. Many Germans,
including the ruling generation of West German politicians, had come
to believe that a German re-unification would be possible only in a
European context. Once the Berlin wall was breached, however, the
East German state disintegrated so quickly that West Germany felt the
need to pick up the rubble immediately. Yet, having believed for a
long time in an inevitable link between German and European uni-
fication, leading German politicians then deemed it necessary to
jump-start some sort of political unification of the EC as well.
After some wavering, the French government agreed to strengthen the
economic, political and military ties with Germany rapidly, that is,
before a German government could have second thoughts about the
venture. Sensing an opportunity to exact new funds for themselves
before the EC could be enlarged by even poorer and thus supposedly
more deserving countries, the poorer EC members (Greece, Portugal,
Ireland and Spain) went along. The lingering negotiations on a
monetary union were speeded up and complemented by a further inter-15
governmental conference on a political union. At their gathering in
Maastricht in December 1991, the heads of governments of the EC
member states agreed on a "Treaty on European Union", the most
substantial reform of the EC ever.
2. The Essence of Maastricht
The Treaty of Maastricht would, if ratified and implemented in full,
change the EC in four major ways.
(1) It would endow the EC with new and far-reaching interventionist
competences in such areas as social policy, industrial policy,
technology policy, consumer protection, the environment, health
and education. To put flesh to the bone of the EC Social
Charter, which was already part of the Project 1992, the EC is
to set common minimum standards on, for example, health and
safety requirements at the workplace, working conditions, gender
equality and the integration of persons excluded from the labour
market. A (qualified) majority vote would suffice for such EC
directives. ' The EC might even centrally enforce those parts of
possible European collective bargaining agreements which deal
with working conditions.
(2) The EC members would be formally obliged to cooperate on im-
migration and asylum policy, on the control of drug trafficking
and in the fight against organised crime.
(3) The EC members would have to agree to create a Common Foreign
and Security Policy. The objectives would have to be agreed
unanimously in the Council of Ministers, but the measures to
implement the policy would require only a majority of votes. The
6) For additional EC directives on such issues as social security
and social protection, dismissal protection and co-determination,
an unanimous vote would be needed.16
Western European Union, a long-dormant club of West European
NATO members, would become the defence arm of the EC within
NATO.
(4) The Treaty sets a detailed plan and a timetable for a monetary
union.
The grave damage which expanded EC intervention!sm would do intern-
ally and externally is well known. Experience has demonstrated time
and again that excessive government interference suppresses market
forces, stiffles economic growth, wastes scarce resources and ex-
acerbates distributional conflicts. It also tends to increase
political tensions within and between countries, as economic de-
cisions are shaped by identifiable politicians rather than by
impartial and anonymous market forces. The same applies to the
equally severe hazards which the common social policy "would entail
notably for the less advanced member countries and their external
competitors. ' A common social policy would impair the com-
petitiveness notably of producers in the poorer and less regulated -
or less effectively regulated - member countries. As compensation,
these countries would tend to demand protection against external
competition as well as additional transfers from external competition
as well as additional transfers from richer members. Incidentally,
such inter-governmental redistributions of tax receipts would weaken
the beneficiaries' incentive to pursue growth-oriented economic
policies and would strengthen the hold of governments over the
economies in their countries. Instead of explicating these well-known
hazards in detail, this essay concentrates on (i) Maastricht's
supposed safeguard against an overambitious community, the principle
of subsidiarity, and (ii) on some aspects of monetary union.
7) In Germany, a public declaration of 9 liberal academics has
drawn attention to these grave hazards [Bernholz et al., 1992];
see also Kiel Institute of World Economics [1992]. For the
repercussions of internal social policy on external protection,
see Curzon Price [1990].17
(i) Subsidiarity
The term "subsidiarity" has enjoyed considerable popularity ever
since the Danish electorate rejected the ratification of Maastricht
in a referendum. In the Treaty of Maastricht, subsidiarity is
enshrined as follows (Art. 3b): "In areas which do not fall within
its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suf-
ficiently achieved by the member-states and can therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by
the Community."
Unfortunately, the general principle begs the major questions:
(i) What is the proper realm of government activities in the first
place, regardless of the layer of government which may undertake
specific activities?
(ii) According to which criteria are the separate tasks of government
to be allocated to its various layers (EC, national, regional,
local)?
If interpreted in the light of a liberal Weltanschauung, the
principle of subsidiarity would leave the EC with few economic tasks
other than safeguarding the international public good of openness and
policing common rules for the resolution of conflicts over trans-
national environmental pollution. As the expanded scope for EC
interventionism shows, this does not seem to be what the fathers of
Maastricht had in mind.
To take the argument to its logical extreme: Even a Soviet Communist
could have happily endorsed the Maastricht definition of subsidiari-
ty. According to his Weltanschauung, nothing would be more effective
than a unitary central plan; and no layer of government could better
subjugate the economies of all the member states to the plan than the
central government in Moscow. In short, as the general principle of
subsidiarity may mean very different things to different people, it
cannot serve as a sufficient and reliable safeguard against an EC
Leviathan (see also Bernholz et al. [1992]). As it stands, the exact18
meaning of the Maastricht definition of subsidiarity will have to be
clarified by "the European Court of Justice once legal disputes reach
the Court. Unfortunately, the EC Court of Justice will have to
interpret the Maastricht definition in the light of the other
provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht. As many of these provisions
are thoroughly interventionist, the EC judges will have little leeway
to interpret subsidiarity in a liberal fashion.
Some EC watchers have taken comfort in a neat distinction which
Maastricht draws between the EC itself, with the Commission as its
executive, and the collaboration among governments of all member
states. Whereas social policy, industrial policy and similar inter-
ventionist activities are to be handled by the original EC itself,
common foreign and security policy as well as immigration, border
controls and some related fields are to be left to the cooperation
among governments. This policy of "separate pillars" reduces the role
of the Commission relative to that of the Council of Ministers, i.e.
the forum of national governments [The Economist, 1992, p. 13]. The
distinction is not all that relevant, though. The precise role of the
EC Commission is less important than the question of whether an issue
is to be decided at the Community level at all, be it within the ac-
customed EC structure or be it by inter-governmental cooperation.
(ii) Currency Union
The Treaty of Maastricht is supposed to chart the way towards a
common currency issued by a common central bank. By the end of 1996,
the heads of the EC governments are to decide by a (qualified)
majority vote whether a majority of member countries is ready for a
currency union. In the case of a positive verdict, the currency union
could be introduced for these countries from the beginning of 1997
onwards. In the case of a negative verdict, countries which are then
deemed to be ready for the union will have to replace their cur-
rencies by a common one at the beginning of 1999.19
Countries will be judged according to several macroeconomic criteria:
a budget deficit not exceeding 3 percent and a public debt not
exceeding 60 percent of GDP; a rate of consumer price inflation
exceeding no more than 1.5 percentage points and a long-term nominal
interest rate exceeding no more than 2 percentage points those of the
three most stable EC members; smooth performance within the Exchange
Rate Mechanism of the EMS in the two preceding years. The criteria
are non-binding, though; they merely provide a basis for a recom-
mendation of the EC Commission to the Council of the heads of EC
governments, which is free in its final decision. Hence, the criteria
need not constrain the macroeconomic policy of member countries very
much.
Highly indebted Belgium (with a debt to GDP ratio of 128.4 percent in
1989) will hardly be able to meet the public-debt criterion, while
low-debt Luxemburg (with a debt ratio of merely 9 percent [Emerson,
1992, p. 109]) will certainly meet it. Yet, Belgium and Luxemburg
have shared a common currency for decades. If the Maastricht criteria
were taken literally, the Belgium-Luxemburg currency union would thus
have to be dissolved, with Belgium being excluded from the common
currency although major EC institutions are located in the Belgian
capital Brussels. This outcome appears to be highly unlikely. The
inevitable conclusion is that the Maastricht criteria for a currency
union cannot and will not be taken literally. Note also that the
example of the Belgium-Luxemburg currency union disproves the oft-
heard assertion that a common currency necessitates political
unification as well.
Of course, the subsequent conduct of a common central bank is more
important than the question as to whether the prospective member
countries may meet some arbitrary criteria beforehand. On paper, the
proposed constitution for the EC central bank is not clearly inferior
to Germany's present - and far from perfect - monetary set-up. Yet, a
Maastricht currency would hardly be as stable as the Bundesbank's
currency [Vaubel, 1992; Giersch, 1992]. For a number of reasons,
monetary unification along the Maastricht lines would be a severe
setback for price level stability in Europe:20
(1) At Maastricht, Western Europe missed the splendid opportunity to
adopt a" liberal monetary constitution, i.e. to let citizens
decide via currency competition whether a common currency is
needed or not. '
(2) Monetary policy will be shaped by central bankers from countries
which, judging by past revealed preferences, are less averse to
inflation than the central bankers of Germany, i.e. of a country
where savings were wiped out twice this century by monetary
misconduct.
(3) Currency competition by the D-Mark, at least in the form of
having the D-Mark exchange rate as a highly visible measuring
rod, has recently restrained monetary policy in major parts of
Western Europe; this salutary influence will be missing in the
case of a common currency.
(4) The larger the area in which a monopoly currency prevails, the
greater the temptation is to abuse it. To inspire the same
confidence and to deliver the same degree of price level
stability which West Germany has enjoyed under the Bundesbank, a
European monetary union would thus need far tighter safeguards
than those of the Bundesbankgesetz.
(5) The monetary union is to be irreversible; countries will not be
able to exercise an exit option. Thus, member countries cannot
discipline the common central bank by threatening to leave the
arrangement if the bank misbehaves.
Furthermore, a common currency makes it impossible to cushion
asymmetric shocks given by nominal realignments although such
realignments could be useful if nominal factor rewards are in-
8) Western Europe's constitutional opportunity, not only in
monetary matters, has been pointed out by Buchanan [1990].21
sufficiently flexible in terms of the domestic currency, while real
factor rewards can be changed by a parity adjustment. Of course, this
need not be a disadvantage. If workers and employers were convinced
in advance that they would not be bailed out, they would react
rationally to the switch in the monetary regime by making factor
rewards more flexible in nominal terms. However, Maastricht obstructs
the incentive to do so. The four member countries whose GDPs per
capita do not exceed 90 per cent of the EC average (Greece, Portugal,
Ireland and Spain) have been granted further payments under the label
of a "cohesion fund". Counting on the "financial solidarity" of
taxpayers in richer EC members, the unions, employers and governments
(at least in the poorer EC countries) have little reason to take
precautions on their own to protect against asymmetric shocks.
Instead, they may rationally opt for excessive cost increases as a
means to exact even more funds from Brussels. Note also that the EC
social legislation will further impair labour market flexibility.
3. A European Cul-de-Sac
All in all, the Treaty of Maastricht stands out in the history of the
EC. Unlike previous integration steps, the new treaty contains hardly
9 } any liberal features. ' It embodies a vision of a uniform EC which is
to be modelled along the lines of an interventionist nation state. In
the words of "The Economist", Maastricht "cites, in one way or
another, just about every goal and policy with which a modern
national government could concern itself" [1992, p. 13]. Maastricht
is the culmination of an integration strategy which was designed for
a small club of West European countries which, because of the cold
war, were cooperating closely on major political and military matters
anyhow. At Maastricht, the EC governments have jointly tried to
create "little European" facts before the EC would finally have to
deal with the fundamental changes going on elsewhere in Europe.
9) The useful but insufficient reform of the EC agricultural
policy may perhaps be regarded as part of a Maastricht process.22
With Maastricht and some important aspects of Project 1992, the EC
has erected barriers to its own enlargement:
(1) The harmonisation approach turns economic issues into matters of
politics. The same holds for the new interventionist competences
for the EC. The more such decisions have to be taken and the
more local affairs are settled by a supranational body in
Brussels (or an intergovernmental conference), the greater the
need for a tight political consensus is. Such a consensus
becomes less feasible if the number of members increases
further. Hence, the reluctance of the club to admit new members
grows with the number and importance of the economic matters to
be decided at the club level.
(2) As Maastricht envisages an enhanced political role for the
Community, any enlargement will reduce the influence which each
single member country has on the common aspects of foreign and
ultimately even defence policy.
(3) Project 1992, Maastricht and the agreement with EFTA countries
on a European Economic Area (EEA) all will strengthen the
redistributive policies of the EC. According to the Community's
own criteria, the emerging market economies of Central and
Eastern Europe would be entitled to substantial financial
support if they were to join the Community or even if they were
to be included in an EEA-type arrangement. Rich EC members (who
would have to pay more) as well as poor ones (who might get
less) thus have an incentive to oppose the inclusion of EMEs.
(4) The EC's common regulations may deter outsiders who are reluc-
tant to give up their own policies which may be better suited to
local circumstances.
Nonetheless, the EC may be able to continue for a while on its
present track. The Community may even take on four - or five or even23
six ' - new members from the EFTA. These relatively rich countries
could afford common Euro-regulations as much or as little as the EC
members themselves; they have already largely accepted them in the
agreement on an EEA; they have also swallowed the principle that they
will be forced to contribute to the EC's redistributive policies if
they want access to the internal market on equal terms. The major
economic stumbling bloc in the negotiations with these countries may
well be agriculture because some EFTA countries have agricultural
regimes which are even more interventionist and more costly than the
Common Agricultural Policy of the EC.
The political obstacles to this enlargement are still formidable
though, (i) At present, small countries have a disproportionately
large voting power in the EC. The small would-be members from the
EFTA are likely to demand the same privilege. This would further
reduce the influence of major countries such as France, Germany,
Britain and Italy in the Community [see The Economist, 1992]. (ii)
The inadequate response of the present EC to the Serbian aggression
against its neighbours (and against its own citizens in Kosovo,
Sandchak and the Vojvodina) has exposed the problems of forging a
common foreign policy among 12 countries; admitting new members with
a tradition of neutrality would make the task even more arduous.
Even if the problems posed by the applicants from the EFTA can
finally be solved without derailing the EC from the Maastricht track,
the real challenge would still be ahead: to incorporate the EMEs into
the European mainstream. These countries are poorer, more numerous
and more in need of EC attention than the EFTA members. The present
EC attempt to build a uniform Community and to integrate markets by
harmonisation-cum-side-payments cannot be extended to the EMEs. If
they were treated like EFTA countries and forced to adopt the entire
10) Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland have applied for member-
ship; Norway may follow soon; what may become of tiny Liechtenstein,
politically independent but economically a part of Switzerland,
remains unclear.24
"acquis communautaire" in order to partake fully in the internal
market, they would have to choose between two great evils, namely
between staying outside despite the great advantages of membership
outlined above - or accepting the high costs of the least-suited EC
regulations. Notably, harmonised social policies and labour laws
might have severe consequences for the EMEs. They need labour market
flexibility and low non-wage labour costs even more than more ad-
vanced regions like the rich EFTA.
Maastricht is heading Western Europe the wrong way. With respect to a
European integration that goes beyond Western Europe, it is a dead
end. Yet, why should the EC bother? The Community could just try to
reach its present goal of a uniform "little Europe" and largely
disregard the concerns of the EMEs, almost as if the Iron Curtain
were still intact. In my view, it is quite unlikely, though, that the
Community will be able to do so for more than a brief span of time.
VI. Can Maastricht Prevail?
The prediction that the "little European" vision of Maastricht will
not be fully implemented in the end, at least not without major
amendments, is based on two major factors: my perception of the
changing role of Germany and the recent precedences for an EC a la
carte.
1. The Changing Role of Germany
After the fall of the Berlin wall, the fear was widespread that a
bigger, reunited Germany might domineer Western Europe. Yet, eastern
Germany accounts for only 21 per cent of the total German population
and 7 per cent of its GDP. This hardly makes for a threatening
enlargement of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nonetheless, the end
of the artificial division of Europe may profoundly change the role
of Germany as concerns the process of European integration. Notably,
Maastricht, which was originally propelled ahead by Germany's im-25
mediate response to the revolution of 1989, may clash with Germany's
medium-run interests. My somewhat speculative predictions are that
Germany will
oppose an EC policy to keep even the westernmost EMEs out,
lose some of its enthusiasm for an EC-wide political union,
- question the integration approach of harmonisation-cum-side-
payments, and
have second thoughts about the monetary union.
Because of its size, living standards, geographic proximity and - to
some extent - cultural affinity, Germany has been and will be
affected far more than other EC members by the short- to medium-run
problems and the long-run prospects for rapid growth in most EMEs.
For the same reasons, Germany will remain the prime choice for
emigrants from the EMEs. Although the number of people from Central
and Eastern Europe who want to settle permanently in the West for
purely economic reasons is likely to be small for the time being, '
emigration could rise if major EMEs were to remain in a deep economic
crisis for long. More importantly, political or military conflicts in
the East may easily spark waves of refugees, as they have done
recently in the wake of the Serbian onslaught against Croatia and
Bosnia. Immigration is likely to be a top concern for German poli-
11) Since the transformation process has begun in earnest in the
EMEs, the most entrepreneurial and mobile segments of the population
will have ample opportunities to become rich and enjoy their incomes
in the EMEs themselves. This distinguishes East-West migration from
South-North migration (for instance the migration from the Maghreb,
where fertility rates are also far higher). Apart from the refugees
from Serbia's war against Croatia and Bosnia, most of the present
immigrants from Eastern Europe belong to special ethnic groups,
notably ethnic Germans and Jews from the former Soviet Union, and
Romanian gypsies.26
12) ticians.
 ; As a consequence of a desire to preempt and prevent mass
immigration from the East, Germany cannot but take a keener interest
in East European affairs than most other EC countries. It is hardly a
coincidence that German politicians have taken Serbia's wars far more
seriously than politicians elsewhere. In order to promote political
stability and economic progress at least in its neighbouring EMEs,
German politicians will probably continue to favour an early
accession of these countries to the EC.
In the process of West European integration, West Germany has not
vigorously pursued many narrowly defined "national interests" so far;
as long as Germany and Europe were divided, West Germany had little
policy-relevant national interests other than close integration with
her Western neighbours and close cooperation with North America
anyhow. The European political union was almost an end in itself, to
some extent regardless of the policies which a unified Europe might
adopt. This has been changing since the opening of Eastern Europe.
The degree of German enthusiasm for a political union per se may well
decline substantially. Ultimately, support for the political union
may roughly reflect the extent to which such a union is perceived as
a vehicle to promote Germany's specific interests. In this respect,
Germany would become more like other medium-sized nations of Europe.
Putting less emphasis an a political union, German politicians may
also see less reason to sacrifice the D-Mark for a highly unpopular
currency union - and risk the wrath not only of liberal economists
but also, more importantly, of the German electorate. The most
troublesome parties of Germany's political right have gratefully
taken up the slogan "Save the D-Mark". If they were to score major
electoral successes, the German government might cancel the plans for
a common currency. As the Maastricht criteria for a monetary union
cannot be taken literally, the inevitable conflicts about the inter-
12) In the four decades of its separate existence, West Germany has
twice experienced a rise of right-wing sentiment and right-wing
parties: in the late 1960s and the late 1980s. In both instances,
public anxiety about an above-average inflow of immigrants con-
tributed to the short-lived success of the right-wing parties.27
pretation of these criteria may offer a convenient pretext for
cancelling these plans.
Within the EC, West Germany so far has been politically willing and
economically able to offer side-payments to other EC members in order
to further the long-term goal of an ever-closer integration of the
EC. Because of the huge costs of German unification, Germany will
have far less leeway for the foreseeable future to defuse intra-EC
conflicts by making side-payments. With Germany's reduced ability to
pay, the approach of harmonisation-cum-side-payments is plainly
infeasible for an Eastern enlargement of the EC.
2. Denmark and the UK: Against the Uniformity Principle
Whereas the above deliberations about Germany's diminishing appetite
for the Maastricht hotchpot are mere speculations, the British
government and the Danish electorate have already undermined the
principle that the Europe of the future must be harmonised and
uniform. In the Treaty of Maastricht, Britain has retained the
privilege to opt out of the currency union and of major parts of the
EC social legislation. Denmark's voters have refused to ratify
Maastricht in a referendum, although polls suggest that most Danes
still support the pre-Maastricht EC. Strictly speaking, the Danish
"No" should have derailed Maastricht as the Treaty needs to be
ratified by all 12 member states. The EC may well find a way out,
probably in the form of provisions which grant Denmark a special
status in some fields of EC legislation. In doing so, however, the
Community would again have to demonstrate that the future of European
integration need not lie in uniform laws and regulations. This may
well whet the appetite of other members for tailor-made clauses for
themselves.
The popular objections against Maastricht which have been voiced in
the recent public debates in Denmark, France and beyond are far from
uniform. They are often not the concerns which liberal economists
would raise.Some Danes, for instance, obviously voted "no" because28
they were afraid that Maastricht might compel Denmark to dilute its
relatively generous social policy. Yet, on a more fundamental level,
most of the popular objections boil down to one major point: Brussels
should not decide these matters. As long as markets are kept suf-
ficiently open, liberals could well trust institutional competition
to sort out the feasible from the not-so-feasible policies at the
national and regional levels.
VII. On the Future of European Integration
At present, it is still likely that Maastricht will be ratified even
though it does not seem to be based on a sustainable consensus among
EC members. Yet, because of the Danish "No" and the German urge to
pay more attention to the concerns of Eastern Europe, it may be
implemented only halfheartedly. Even if the EC tries to continue on
its present trackr the conflicts among its members and between the EC
and would-be members are likely to intensify over the coming years,
ultimately making a thorough overhaul of the EC inevitable. To make
the Community fit for enlargement in the near future, the EC needs to
become more liberal and to allow for a greater diversity. More
precisely, the EC will have to
- put less emphasis on harmonisation and economic interventionism,
scale down its economically harmful and politically divisive
redistributive activities, and
weaken the link between economic integration and political
co-operation.
If the Community is to become deeper and wider without burdening
itself with an ever-greater potential for internal conflicts, it will
have to concentrate its common activities on fewer and more essential
tasks. Of course, opinions may differ as to which tasks should belong
to the proper realm of a wider community. I shall present my views in
two steps. At first, I shall briefly state what I consider to be a
liberal ideal before I make some slightly more modest suggestions as
to how the EC could move at least somewhat in this direction.29
In the ideal case, Europe would introduce a clear separation of
economics and politics. To be more precise, the EC would give way to
two distinct clubs, a somewhat narrow political club and a broader
economic club based on liberal principles. The citizens in some
European countries seem to genuinely favour the evolution of a common
foreign and defence policy. These countries should be free to create
such a political club. Independent of this political club, the
present EC members and all other European countries who can subscribe
to some common economic principles should establish a purely economic
club which, unlike the soon-to-be European Economic Area EEA between
the EC and the EFTA, is an attractive economic alternative rather
than a mere antechamber for the political club. The political
rationale for a clear separation of economics and politics is that no
country should be compelled by considerations of gaining market
access to join a political club. Reluctant members are likely to
dilute the political substance of the club; the pursuit of, for
instance, close Franco-German collaboration would become ever more
difficult if it had to be done in the framework of a club whose
membership were to grow from 12 to, say, 24. Attempts to attain with
one instrument, namely a uniform institution called EC, the two
separate and not always complementary goals of economic integration
and political unification are likely to result in bad economics
(excessive interventionism) and bad politics (partial paralysation)
at the same time.
The typical European nation state in which all decisions ranging from
the economic order to possibly the closing hours of shops are taken
at the national level can hardly serve as a model for the future
economic integration of Europe. Instead, the parallel processes of
geographic widening and economic deepening make an appropriate
assignment of tasks to the various levels of decision-making within
Europe (supra-national, national, regional and local) ever more
urgent. The proper tasks of a European Economic Club would be the
evolution and enforcement of common basic principles on the free
movement of goods and services, and capital and skills, in Europe,
including minimum principles of external economic policy, an internal
anti-subsidies code and the mutual recognition of the various30
national, regional or local regulatory systems. Even if genuine
non-pecuniary cross-border externalities were involved, common rules
for horizontal negotiations between the affected parties would be
superior to a centrally determined policy, at least as long as the
transaction costs involved in the negotiations were not prohibitively
high.
The power to shape tax and regulatory systems - and to devise
income-support schemes for farmers to replace the Common Agricultural
Policy - should be allocated to the lowest conceivable level in a
proper European Economic Club. The more local and regional units have
the freedom to choose their own mixes of taxes, regulations and
public services, the more the ensuing competition for internationally
mobile resources can serve as procedure for discovering optimal
institutional arrangements.
Naturally, the criteria for accession would need to be different for
the economic and for the political club. The economic club which
safeguards the freedoms of citizens against their government should
be automatically open to all countries who accept a liberal disci-
pline; the political club needs to restrict its membership to those
countries who endorse the specific policy aims of the club (such as
Franco-German cooperation or the prevention of further Serbian-style
aggressions). The recent political and military conflicts in post-
communist Eastern Europe have underlined the need for an effective
political club which is capable of responding swiftly - and whose
activities need not be lastingly blocked by, say, Greek aversions to
the name of its northern neighbour, Macedonia. Whereas some coun-
tries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are not yet
members of the EC may want to join even a tightly knit political
union, some of the present EC members may prefer not to join. In the
foreseeable future, the atomic superpower Russia may well be eligible
for the economic club, though probably not for the political club.
Of course, the liberal vision outlined above may be politically
infeasible for the time being. Some slightly more modest and thus
slightly more feasible measures would help the EC to avoid the worst31
pitfalls of Maastricht and let Europe move closer to the ideal
situation:
(1) Maastricht should not be ratified unless the subsidiarity
principle is clarified along liberal lines. The Danish "No" to
Maastricht provides a convenient opportunity and a further reason
to do so.
(2) This subsidiarity principle should be elevated to a constitu-
tional level and take precedence over other existing or future EC
legislation. Member states as well as individual citizens should
be invested with the right to invoke it at the EC Court of
Justice in order to challenge, for instance, the interventionist
provisions of Maastricht and the already established harmoni-
sation directives of Project 1992.
(3) The British privilege to opt out of the monetary union and the
major aspects of the EC social legislation should be granted to
each present and future EC member.
(4) Similarly, each member should be able to opt out of the inter-
governmental cooperation on foreign policy, security policy and
defence policy. The right of EC member governments to co-operate
on these matters in groups which do not encompass all EC members
should be explicitly endorsed.
(5) A cap should be put on the redistributive activities of the EC,
perhaps in the form of a freeze in nominal terms. ' New members
(the rich EFTA newcomers) should neither be forced to contribute
to such activities nor be automatically included among the
beneficiaries (the poor EMEs and Mediterranean newcomers)
thereof.
13) I owe the idea of a freeze in nominal terms to a discussion
with Lutz Hoffmann on German and European subsidies.32
(6) For each additional competence given to Brussels or an inter-
governmental conference and with each step towards a widening of
the EC, some other competences should be handed back to the
constituent countries or even to regions within them.
(7) To improve the existing association agreements with the three
westernmost EMEs (or four after the split-up of Czecho-
slovakia), further negotiations - or binding unilateral steps on
the part of the EC - should
clarify the date and conditions of accession to the EC,
- thoroughly restrict the application of safeguards and escape
clauses for both the EMEs and the EC,
strengthen the anti-subsidies provisions for the EMEs,
reduce barriers to agricultural trade on both sides,
immediately exempt the EMEs from the EC anti-dumping policy as
if they were already EC members, and
relax the EC's local-content rules for EME imports.
These steps could turn the EMEs into a prime choice for foreign
(and domestic) investors looking for a location to serve the
European market. Of course, the same recommendations apply to
possible agreements with further EMEs.
(8) Upon joining the Community, the European EMEs would need the
opportunity to opt for a simplified version of the EC "acquis
communautaire" and to opt out of those aspects of EC legislation
which add to production costs. Such a solution would not need to
be restricted to a period of transition. Instead, it could
constitute a major step toward a lasting deregulation within the
EC. In return, these countries would not participate in the
internal redistributive schemes of the EC.
These steps could help to set Europe on a track which may finally
lead towards a liberal commonwealth which derives its strength from
the diversity of its members.33
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